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Beyond the womb and the tomb: identity, (dis)embodiment and 
the life course.     
This paper asks how the unborn and the dead may acquire or sustain social 
identity in the absence of the body.  In so doing, it draws attention to the 
processes through which identity comes into being, particularly the 
contestations which occur around, or indeed constitute these processes.  
Positioned at the borderlines of embodiment, this enquiry therefore raises new 
questions about the relationship between body and social identity.   Its starting 
point is the position, now accepted within the social sciences, that selfhood is 
not only social but embodied (Featherstone, 1991; Shilling, 1993; Jenkins, 2004; 
O’Neill, 2004).  What it goes on to ask about are social identities which emerge, 
or persist, despite the absence of the body, seeming to require no more than the 
pretext of an imagined future or a remembered past embodiment.  It is here 
where social identity might seem at best precarious, at worst implausible, that 
we investigate a cluster of material practices, technologies and objects 
associated with conception, pregnancy and birth; and death, dying and 
bereavement.  These include ultrasound imaging of the foetus, the viewing of a 
birth or of a corpse, and the tending of a grave.  We show how these practices 
and items of material culture resource what Mulkay (1993:33) calls ‘social 
existence’ before and after the period of human embodiment we know as the 
ʹlife courseʹ.     What Mulkay means by ‘social existence’ is the participation of 
the individual within social life, and he notes how illness, incapacity or indeed 
social isolation can reduce this – and indeed how social relationships which 
transcend death can sustain the participation of the dead in ‘the observable 
social world as that world is understood by survivors’ (1993:33)i. 
 
Many of the practices we describe here occur within ‘homely’ moments: for 
example, when young couples tell in-laws that they are to become 
grandparents, or when elderly widows draw comfort from their dead partner’s 
residual possessions and discover how these resource a sense of their persistent 
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presence.  Yet such practices also occupy the wider context of today’s highly 
politicised contestations about the nature, status and rights of the unborn and 
the dead: tensions around abortion rights and foetal medicine (Foster, 1995), 
assisted conception (The Independent on Sunday, 24.6.01), and ʹdesignerʹ babies 
whose tissue or organs may save a siblingʹs life (The Guardian, 23.7.04); scandals 
around the breach of ritual codes when bodies were photographed on a 
hospital chapel floor (The Guardian, 16.1.01) or hidden in the woods around a 
crematorium (The Guardian, 18.2.02), concerns about the repatriation of bodies 
from museum collections (The Independent on Sunday, 10.11.02) and uproar 
about the retention of body parts by hospitals (The Guardian, 16.2.99).  Claims 
for the citizenship rights of the dead, for example - as in the Dead Citizensʹ 
Charter - are made within discourses such as medicine, the legal system and 
also popular culture.  The materialities of the foetus and the corpse are thus 
resonant, and indeed can become powerfully emotive within both public and 
private arenas.      
 
Between womb and tomb? 
It is within the context of current social and political debates about the status of 
the unborn and the dead that we locate our investigation of pre- and post- life 
identity-making, or identification (Jenkins, 2004).  Indeed ours is an historically 
specific enquiry which asks whether a model of the life course which begins at 
‘birth’ and ends at ‘death’ is currently adequate, either empirically or 
theoretically.  Bryman et al (1987) argued that preference for the term life 
course, rather than life cycle, reflected an awareness of historical context, a 
recognition that age-based social identities are particular to eras or centuries – 
and therefore susceptible to change.  The term ‘life course’ also takes account of 
how different early life identities then have their own particular implications 
for later life, rather than simply assuming a predetermined map of the ‘life 
cycle’.  All this is relevant for the material we present here.   
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In challenging current models of the life course, we begin by asking whether 
contemporary thought and practice potentiate an extended Western life course 
that is social, intersubjective and involves a different take on the body.  Harris 
(1987), for example, describes life course transitions as relational processes, 
‘movements over time between positions in social space’ (1987:20).  These, we 
argue, are themselves subject to change across different historical periods.  
Thus, for example, until recently Western models of bereavement promoted a 
therapeutic ʹletting goʹ of the dead, the severance of relationships once death 
has occurred (see, for example, Worden 1991).  New models of grief (Walter 
1996), however, emphasise ‘continuing bonds’ between the living and the dead 
(Klass et al 1996) and sanction their active roles within the lives of close 
survivors.   If this is indeed the case, we then need to ask what materials might 
be available to resource a life course which is historically specific to 
contemporary Western society; how are they pressed into service; and which 
facets of (an) individual(ʹs) identity constitute ‘social existence’?   Just as 
continuing bonds may be sustained between the living and the dead, so we can 
also consider the ‘social existence’ of the unborn who came to haunt abortion 
debates in the second half of the twentieth century and now, increasingly, 
constrain the diets of pregnant women.   How and to what extent have they 
come to be included within the life course?   As Layne says of the memorial 
items now treasured and displayed by the mothers of stillborn babies, ʹthey 
reaffirm the rightness and powerful desirability of proper life trajectories but 
challenge prevailing notions as to what qualifies for inclusion in this narrative 
structureʹ (2000:339). 
 
If, like Layne (2000), we query assumptions about the temporal profile of the 
life course, it is important to acknowledge that ‘life’, in contra-distinction to 
‘death’, has no self-evident, naturalised characteristics and boundaries.  Models 
of the ‘life course’ cannot, therefore, be seen to stand in any unmediated 
relationship with the materiality of the body.   Rather, they represent particular, 
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often politicized positions which mobilize moral, legal, emotional and 
biological evidence and so lay rhetorical claim to the status of the ‘real’.   An 
examination of the boundaries of the embodied life course amplifies this point, 
showing that the choice of bodily indicators that ʹlifeʹ has started, or stopped is 
highly contingent, depending upon political position or historical location.  
These indicators have included, for example, conception, the quickening, the 
increasingly early age of foetal viability (see Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA));  cessation of breathing, heartbeat, brainstem 
function (Arnold et al, 1997).   Moreover we are not dealing simply with 
selective readings of the body.  Medical interventions into bodily processes may 
testify to professionals’ capacity to save life; yet in so doing they reveal the 
uncertainty of the relationship between ‘life’ and ‘death’.   Thus in Harveyʹs 
(1996, 1997) ethnographies of two Intensive Care Units and a Maternity 
Hospital labour ward, medical science and medical technology resource 
physicians’ proactive management of the clinical uncertainty of birth and 
death.  Faced with the unpredictable outcome of critical illness in ICU, medical 
technology allows a spurious appearance of control; yet in dealing with the 
process of birth, its riskiness is foregrounded, so paving the way for 
technological intervention.  In both cases, medical ownership of an unstable 
bodily process is secured.    And if we move beyond the clinically uncertain 
boundaries between birth, life and death, we find only a thin line sometimes 
being drawn between a late period and an early miscarriage (Johnson and 
Puddifoot, 1998).  
 
Such uncertainties and instabilities lead us to treat  the ‘life course’ as a social 
institution, rather than a process of routine organic transformations more aptly 
construed as the ‘life cycle’.  Yet this does not mean we can bracket the body, 
whether ‘real’ as in the present, imagined as in the future, or remembered as in 
the past.    As Jenkins argues, ‘Identification in isolation from embodiment is 
unimaginable’ (2004:19).   Indeed, as he goes on to demonstrate, identity has 
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contexts and consequences, many of which are material in form.   What we set 
out to do here is explore the ways in which embodiment figures within 
identification outwith the taken-for-granted gate posts of ‘birth’ and ‘death’.   
De Vries, argued that  ʹ[a]t birth a previously non-existent individual appears, 
at death an existing individual passes into non-existenceʹ (1981:1075).   We 
suggest that where this is indeed the case, we need to ask how this ‘non-
existence’ was brought into being and by what means access to social identity 
was debarred.  The absence, invisibility or sequestration of the human body 
alone is insufficient grounds for social ‘non-existence’.  As Lock (2002) argues in 
the case of body parts, the Western practice of postmortem organ harvesting 
and transplantation requires the deliberate effacement of any social identity and 
the commodification of body parts.   
 
Bodies in mind 
One of this paper’s starting points is data gathered by Jan Draper (2000; 
2002a,b; 2003a,b) who conducted focus groups and then interviews with 18 men 
both during and after their partners’ pregnancies.  Working according to 
ethnographic principles, Draper’s longitudinal study involved focus groups 
and interviews with novice and experienced fathers.  Interviews were 
conducted at three points: twice during their partner’s pregnancy and then 
between 6 to 8 weeks postnatally.  The purpose of the study was to explore 
men’s transition to their new identities as fathers.  As we go on to show, these 
data suggest the precarious nature of social identity prior to birth.  They also 
point towards the mechanisms through which it might be claimed.  Thus, 
during the periods before and indeed after ‘life’, social identities cannot simply 
be assumed.  Indeed, Van Gennep refers to the slightly later event of birth 
announcements as  ʹclaim(s) for ... a place among the livingʹ (authors’ emphasis) 
(Wilson, cited in Van Gennep [1907] 1960: 63).  Thus, for men, pregnancy can be 
purely a private matter, as reliant on and confident in their partners’ ‘insider’ 
awareness of the pregnancy, they trust in the primacy of this embodied 
6 
knowledge.   Rooted deeply within the womanʹs body, the baby was described 
by one of the fathers interviewed by Draper (2000) as ʹa secret that you can 
nurture between yourselves for a whileʹ.  However some of the men in her 
study were dissatisfied with this level of confirmation and many of the men 
(predominantly first-time fathers) sought ‘official confirmation’ from the 
General Practitioner (GP).  This professional validation, or validity check, is a 
first step towards claiming an identity for their unborn child.  This process 
takes place within the social context of family and friends, a move from a 
private to a public realm resourced by the authority of medical science.  And 
menʹs initiation into new social identities of their own, as expectant fathers, is 
itself achieved via its scientific framing and its public announcement.    
 
These data are then set alongside Jenny Hockey’s work on illness, ageing and 
death (Hallam, Hockey and Howarth 1999).  This theoretical account draws on 
a range of ethnographic sources to argue that while social identity can be 
undermined or even extinguished through bodily and mental deterioration, the 
demise of the body is not necessarily a bar to the continued social participation 
of the individual.  Thus, in the case of dead children, photographs and other 
artefacts provide ʹsocial propsʹ or ʹobjects of discourseʹ which parents use to 
sustain those children’s social presence and, in the process, maintain their own 
parental identities (Riches and Dawson, 1998).   In this paper we therefore 
appraise examples of pre-birth and post-mortem identities and explore their 
status in relation to embodied social identities such as ‘child’, ‘teenager’, ‘adult’ 
or ‘older person’.  Can the unborn and the dead achieve forms of social 
presence which might require us to extend our models of the life course?  In 
addressing these questions we consider the relationship between the body and 
social identity, showing it to be anything but straightforward.  Instead, as we 
go on to argue, life course transitions in particular can produce states of body-
based categorical ambiguity within which it becomes unclear as to whether 
someone is ‘alive’ or ‘dead’, whether they constitute a social being of some kind 
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or simply a material trace.  As the examples of abortion debates and organ  
retention scandals show, contested identities are rife within these zones of 
uncertainty and here, we argue, the privileging of visuality can resource ‘truth’ 
claims.  The paper concludes by exploring the operation of visuality in more 
detail, demonstrating its capacity to edit or bracket selected aspects of the 
visual field and so shore up the persuasiveness of claims to ‘a place among the 
living’ (Van Gennep [1907] 1960: 63).   In sum, this paper provides an 
exploration of the materials and the mechanisms through which identification 
takes place across a temporal spectrum which extends beyond the customary 
life course boundaries of ‘birth’ and ‘death’.  As such it raises questions about 
the relationship between embodiment and the life course which have 
implications for the way we recognize where the life course begins and ends.  
 
Contestation and Categorical Ambiguity    
If the relationship between the body and social identity is complex and 
unstable, the mechanisms through which identity may be either claimed or 
effaced are nowhere more evident than during life course transitions.  It is here 
that contestation is rife.  For example, the way in which a man who has made a 
woman pregnant will categorise the cessation of that pregnancy at an early 
stage is likely to reflect his relationship with the woman concerned.  Has he lost 
his child or been let off the ‘commitment’ hook?  However he appraises the 
event, he may also find his view either supported or contested by other 
interested parties, such as the woman herself, her parents, her friends, her 
husband.  Anthropological work on rites of passage sheds light on ambiguities 
such as these.  It addresses the liminal or indeterminate nature of transitional 
processes such as pregnancy, drawing attention to the uncertain status of those 
making transitions between established identities: for example, the categorical 
ambiguity of the newborn and the recently deceased who are lodged 
temporarily at the boundaries of the social world of the living.  Robert Hertz 
([1907] 1960), uses the word ʹsacredʹ, meaning ʹset apartʹ or not of the everyday 
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or profane world, to describe the bodies of such beings: ʹThe body of the new-
born child is no less sacred than the corpseʹ (Hertz [1907] 1960: 81).  Whether it 
has the status of an object or a person is therefore open to competing claims.   
 
A further example of the ambiguous relationship between the body and social 
identity can be found in the case of Alzheimer’s Disease.  In the West, the 
individual with Alzheimerʹs Disease is at risk of being ascribed the ambiguous 
status of ‘socially dead’ (Mulkay, 1993), since medicalisation of their changed 
mental capacities can cause them to fall somewhere between the dominant 
categories of embodied ‘life’ and ‘death’.  Just as death does not automatically 
rob the sequestered corpse of social identity, so embodiment alone does not 
ensure social participation or presence. Jonathan Miller describes how 
medicalised perceptions of the individual with dementia can lead them to be 
viewed as: ʹan uncollected corpse, [there is] this terrible thing which is walking 
around, which the undertaker has cruelly forgotten to collectʹ (1990:230).  So, 
within these frameworks, a person suffering from Alzheimer’s could be 
described as biologically alive, yet socially dead.  By contrast, the dead 
themselves may remain socially alive: as ancestors, spirits, ghosts, dear 
departed children or long-lived spouses (Hallam, Hockey and Howarth, 1999: 
1-19).  As Mulkay has argued, ʹit is entirely possible for people to sustain a 
lasting, personal relationship which affects the course of their daily lives with 
an individual whom they know to be deadʹ.  However, as in the capacity of 
dementia to undermine of social identity – or at least its outward manifestation 
in the public, external person, or personhood (Jenkins, 2004:28), so Lawtonʹs 
(2000) ethnography of hospice death reveals that forms of cancer which literally 
break down the body’s boundaries can rescind claims to social identity made 
by either the dying person or their survivors.  While a hospice visitor may 
contest this process by continuing to sit at their ‘relative’s’ bedside, that 
individual may already have extinguished social participation and quite 
literally turned their face to the wall. 
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In these examples therefore, the body in transition – between life and death, or 
in the marginal zones which anticipate and succeed embodiment - occupies a 
position of categorical ambiguity which renders its relationship with social 
identity uneasy.    As such its status is open to competing claims and what we 
now consider are the rhetorical strategies through which the body can 
nonetheless be pressed into service, despite its absence or ambiguous status. 
 
Mobilising the body 
What this paper argues is that the objects and practices which cluster prior to 
birth or after death can provide insight into how the unborn and the dead are 
socialized or ‘animated’.    For example, ultrasound scans and residual clothing 
constitute body-based traces which are recoverable in identification narratives, 
or appropriated via practice.  Layne provides this account from America: 
 
 Women now may actively construct the personhood of their wished-
 for child from the moment they do a home pregnancy test.  Each cup 
 of coffee or glass of wine abstained from, and each person informed of 
 the impending birth adds to the ʹrealnessʹ of the baby they are  
 growing withinʹ (2000:322).   
 
The newly proven pregnancy is therefore all about the future embodied child.  
It is this which promises parenthood, grandparenthood and a potential range of 
additional emotional, familial and economic shifts in the bases of social 
identity.  Similarly the growing practice of removing ashes from crematoria can 
resource bereaved individuals’ attempts to maintain a relationship with a 
deceased relative.  Findings from an investigation of the destinations of this 
body residue (Hockey, Kellaher and Prendergast, 2004) reveal examples of 
polytainers of ashes being placed on settees in front of the television, on chairs 
at the dining table and armchairs in conservatories, on the beds of the 
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immediately bereaved.  Located within the social environment of the home, 
ashes then become a focus for ‘dialogue’ and conversation.  Pre- and post-life 
identities therefore appear to retain strong links with the body.  For example, 
they can be resourced by pregnancy-test evidence of the body encased in the 
motherʹs flesh, by the ultrasound image, the headstone or grave site, and by 
residues or traces such as clothing, jewellery, hair, ashes, photographic images, 
handwriting. The body itself therefore remains a core resource for identification 
even during  zones which are marginal to the embodied social life course.      
 
This, we argue, represents a metonymic extension of its privileged role within 
Western processes of social identification more generally (Davis Floyd 1990; 
Lupton 1994, 1998).  Thus, for women, the status passage to parenthood centres 
on embodied experience, leaving men without body-based substance for their 
transition to the social identity ‘father’.  Draper’s (2000) qualitative interview 
and focus group data reveal men’s emphasis on body-mediated-moments (a 
‘proxy’ embodiment, mediated by and through their partner’s body): for 
example, pregnancy confirmation and announcement, ultrasound scans, 
antenatal classes and attendance at the birth.  While womenʹs epistemological 
standpoint was their embodied experience of pregnancy, men were vicarious 
knowers  (Sandelowski and Black 1994).   In a similar fashion the relationship 
between the body of a loved one and their ashes is mediated by the fiery 
technology of the cremator.  Yet ashes remain as a body residue which for some 
bereaved people constitutes the essence of the deceased (Hockey, Kellaher and 
Prendergast, 2004).  At either end of the life course, therefore, the body-to-be 
and the body-that-was, in their parallel invisibility, constitute powerful 
focusses for representation and identification.  These recover the body from the 
sequestration of hospital management and the obscurity of the womb and the 
tomb.   
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Visuality and ‘Truth’  
Thus far, we have identified a range of practices which can be utilized to 
resource identity outwith the body itself.  How these lay claim to rhetorical 
power is however an additional question which needs to be addressed and   
here we call attention to the status of visual evidence within post-
Enlightenment debate and contestation.   Thus, when men described glimpsing 
the baby on the screen, they said it felt like an escalation of its reality (Draper, 
2000:36).   Seen as an authentic window into the interior of the womanʹs body, 
the ultrasound image gave them access to something they recognised as ʹthe 
babyʹ.  The western privileging of visual knowledge (Jenks, 1995), its capacity to 
underwrite ‘truth’ claims, is evident in men’s citation of this first real ʹevidenceʹ 
of the baby, other than the pink or blue line of the pregnancy test.  Indeed the 
rise of visual technologies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has 
resulted in a shift from a haptic (derived from embodied knowledge) to an 
optical hexis, one derived and sustained primarily through vision.  This optical 
hexis displaces the woman’s felt experience (Franklin, 1991) and the traditional 
markers of pregnancy, so that now, rather than relying on the woman’s 
embodied awareness of the baby’s first movements, the haptic hexis, 
technological evidence is accorded greater validity (Draper, 2003b).  Like the 
men Jordan interviewed (1990), Draper’s informants felt their identity as fathers 
took on substance after they had viewed the sonogram.   For example, Steve, a 
novice father, told her:  
 
Afterwards I was sort of a couple days completely dazed because 
that was the first time that it really crystallised into anything.  Up 
until then it was just a sort of vague blobby thing that was going to 
happen seven months away.  It was going to happen at the end of 
the summer.  And er since then it has felt real, it has felt as though 
thereʹs a human being.   
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As a technology which gives visual access to the interior of the body, 
ultrasonography has roots in earlier devices such as dissection (Jordanova, 
1989; Sawday 1995).  Its panoptic gaze abstracts the baby from the mother, 
lending it an independent health-based identity as  ʹfoetal patientʹ.  However, in 
the transition from private ʹsecretʹ to medical image, a resource for social 
identity-making becomes available.  Parents now use the ultrasound scan to 
transform the foetus into our baby (Weir 1998), combining their own 
imagination and the machine generated image (Black 1992:52).  Approximately 
half the men interviewed by Draper had placed the ultrasound scan in the new 
family album.  As an emblem of the hidden baby (Duden 1993), the sonogram 
occupies an unrivalled position, the public manifestation of a unique private 
experience.  The sonogram is therefore a hybrid, technologically generated but 
naturally gestated (Boulter 1999:16).  As a concrete image, it resources an 
otherwise abstract, disembodied conception of the baby, an ʹobject of discourseʹ 
which establishes the significance of a life-to-be (Riches and Dawson, 1998).  In 
sum, ultrasonography conjoins the professional paradigm of the ultrasound as 
a diagnostic event with a social event, the couple’s first opportunity to ʹseeʹ the 
baby.    In this way, the ultrasound, as an example of ante-partum portraiture, 
brings a future identity into the present. 
  
In contrast, this temporal trajectory is reversed among those who survive us; 
the focus of the present is the past, brought into the moment via the memory.  
And here visuality represents a highly valued resource for recovering 
‘authentic’ material traces of the previously embodied dead.  As C.S.Lewis 
describes in a published account of the grief he suffered at the death of his wife 
(1964), it was when he found himself incapable of evoking any visual memory 
of her that he felt most bereft.  From the Early Modern period onwards effigies, 
death masks and, currently, photographs, constitute visual representations 
which animate the remembered social body of the deceased.  These are sites for 
identification which bracket the natural, cremated or decomposing body and so 
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mask or defer the eventual dissolution of material existence.  On mantle-pieces 
and graves and in obituaries, the body that was resources social identity in the 
present, often depicted at an earlier and happy point in the life course.  In 
Sontagʹs (1977) view, photography became a ʹrite of family lifeʹ when 
industrialisation fractured what she calls ʹthe larger family aggregateʹ.  As she 
says: 
 
 ʹ ... photography came along to memorialize, to restate symbolically, 
 the imperiled continuity and vanishing extendedness of family life.  
 Those ghostly traces, photographs, supply the token presence of  
 dispersed relativesʹ (1977:9). 
 
Thus, visual imagery accords a proxy embodiment to both the imagined 
relative-to-be, the baby - and the remembered relative-that-was.  This enables   
participation in ʹthe larger family aggregateʹ in the present.   Nineteenth century 
American postmortem photography (Ruby, 1995), for example, evoked the 
living individual whilst asleep, often with markers of embodied social identity, 
such as the toys of dead children .    
 
A fictional portrait of a childʹs grandmother in 1960s Belgium (Mortier, 2001), 
echoes this practice.  In the nearby churchyard the grandmother tends the 
graves of the family’s dead; in the home she relocates their photos to a glass-
fronted cabinet where they compete with one another for proximity to a statue 
of the Virgin.  The grandchild narrator compares photos of the living and dead: 
ʹ[w]ithin the confines of the glass-fronted cabinet the dead faded less rapidly 
than the living, whose austerely framed portraits hung unprotected on the 
walls of the parlour.  They were not swathed in garlands of gilt or ribbons of 
silver ... ʹ (Mortier, 2001: 2-3).  Rather than the elegiac qualities which Sontag 
attributes to all photographs (cited in Turner, 1995), such images recover the 
dead, recreating their social identities in the present.    In contrast, family 
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photographs of the corpse have become uncommon in the West.  Instead such 
images are sequestrated within the legal and medical systems, evidence of 
pathologies, injuries and suicidal acts.  
  
The stillborn child, however, is an exception.  Without a remembered past, 
photographs of the childʹs dead body stand as representations of its imagined 
future, alongside its name, clothing and grave, to be carried forward by the 
family.  Such photographs are likely to remain private, however, unavailable 
for indiscriminate viewing.    
  
More commonly, therefore, the photograph permits the recovery of the dead as 
favourably remembered in life.  In the home a flattering image may be 
displayed; in the obituary, the deceased is represented via markers of their 
social identity.  In Bytheway and Johnsonʹs study (1996:224) of the eighty-six 
obituaries published in Guardian in June 1995, fifty-seven carried a 
photograph: ʹan actress in a still from a film or a lone sailor at the helm of his 
yachtʹ.  Thirty-nine of the images showed the deceased when much younger.  
These images are ʹintended to be a named portrait, one that encapsulates 
something of the essence of the personʹs characterʹ (Bytheway and Johnson, 
1996:224).  Through editing, therefore, these images of the body that was or the 
body-to-be can resource the memory and the imagination, so generating an 
expansive social life course.  Not only is body-based visuality privileged, but the 
meanings associated with these representations  are negotiated within particular 
social domains - the family, the isolated elderly widow/er, for example.   Not 
given in any sense, social identity is nonetheless claimed via material items and 
practices which promise or evoke human embodiment. 
 
Ways of Seeing   
In 1972, Berger described the relationship between what we see and what we 
know as unsettled, a perceptual process which is shaped within society’s visual 
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culture.  His work argued for the political centrality of images and showed the 
‘gaze’ to be far from neutral, instead extending selectively across the object or 
landscape surveyed.  This process of visual editing or selection is evident in the 
way men perceive pregnancy and labour (Lupton and Barclay, 1997), and in the 
images, objects and items selected to memorialize the dead (Hallam and 
Hockey, 2001).  These are social practices which draw upon body-mediated 
moments, or bodily traces in order to re-appropriate life course transitions 
where professionals had previously gained the upper hand.  Their aim is to 
foster social relationships across the boundaries between life and death and as 
such involve the claiming of social identities outwith embodiment.  These 
relationships are not, however, self evident, but instead make visual use of the 
body to create complex bodily associations or connections which are highly 
mediated.   Sawday (1995), for example, argues that the ultrasound ʹbabyʹ is 
simply a technologically generated representation – an abstraction from the 
entirety of the foetus lying integrated within its intra-uterine environment.   Yet 
this valorising of visual access extends into the act of birth itself.  Men’s 
enthusiasm for seeing the baby born (Draper 2000) reveals their visually 
mediated epistemological standpoint.  James describes the water birth of his 
third child: 
 
So I saw his, first saw his head erm, very clearly under water, in fact 
even more clearly than out of the water because everythings 
magnified so.  His head looked enormous, his little hand sort of 
curled up by the side of his cheek.  And then she pushed him out 
and he very gracefully rose to the surface. 
  
However, this engagement with the prospect of embodied fatherhood also 
exposed men to sights, sounds and smells from which they were normally 
protected.   When giving emotional support or feeling squeamish, men stayed 
at what they called ʹthe head endʹ; those keen to see the baby emerge chose ‘the 
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bottom endʹ.   Rather than an holistic act of witness, their ‘vision’ was selective; 
a labour ʹmeridianʹ allowed them to bracket  ‘polluting’ or ‘dirty’ aspects of a 
womanʹs body.  By staying above the labour meridian, men defused the threat 
of encountering the woman’s unbounded body, a disruption to prevailing 
notions of the body as a container (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).  Thus Nigel 
anticipated his position: 
  
Erm....I think the head end I think.  Because erm....I suppose 
its, I’d be there for encouragement and er....the thing is you 
know the communication.  Thatʹs the communication end of 
your body if you like.    
 
This visual fracturing of the body has parallels in Early Modern 
memorialisation which divides the body through a doubling of images.  These 
separate bodily disintegration from social integrity; for example, the transi 
tomb represents the social body in the trappings of its social identity - a crown, 
armour - lying above the natural decaying body.  The effigy and the death 
mask act similarly.  Llewllyn (1991:54) notes that where this treatment of the 
corpse takes place, it concerns ʹthe survival and re-presentation of the social 
body rather than conservation of the natural body per se’.  
   
What these examples demonstrate is the role of visuality in shoring up 
embodiment’s social nature.  Whilst resourced by the body, these traces of 
future or past embodiment show that identification can result from struggle, if 
not direct contestation.  Thus the material body is not simply core to the 
conditions of possibility for social identity; it also has the capacity to 
undermine, disrupt or erase it.  This may occur via the advancing boundaries of 
the pregnant body and its capacity to destabilise the distinction between 
multiplicity and singularity (Draper 2003b); or via the breakdown of the body’s 
boundaries during birth.  Parallel disruptions can feature within the process of 
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dying where fungating tumours can penetrate the body’s surface (see above 
Lawton, 2000), or via the body’s eventual postmortem dissolution.  Once this 
occurs, social identity can however be made to shift from the painful present 
into a remembered past.  This loss, precipitated by particular dying trajectories, 
may subsequently be repaired by the funeral director, however, just as medical 
ultrasound images are reworked within family narratives to establish the 
ʹrealityʹ of a son or daughter (Layne, 2000).  In her ethnography of funeral 
directing, Howarth (1996) argues that the family does not witness a restoration 
of the natural body which masks the reality of death.  Rather, they participate 
in a reconstruction of the social identity, ‘embodied’ at the site of corpse, 
colluding in its performative or theatrical dimensions.  Presented primarily for 
ʹviewʹ, the body is touched only selectively. Howarth says: 
 
 Workers utilise theatrical techniques to stage the desired image, and 
 families, not searching for the secrets, refuse to look for the props.  To 
 raise the coverlet, for example, or to glimpse beneath the bodyʹs  
 clothing would destroy the image ... mourners ... are searching for  
 presence and continuity of identity (cited in Hallam et al 1999).   
 
In sum, viewing the dead body affords only a particular, stage-managed view, 
one which helps (re)create the social identity of the deceased. 
 
Therapeutic initiatives, such as the injunctions of the bereavement literature 
(Worden 1991), valorise viewing the corpse as a way of encountering the reality 
of death and so recovering from grief (Hockey 1996).  More accurately, if this 
act is mediated via the bodily interventions instituted by the funeral director, it 
can be seen to resource the claiming of postmortem social identity, just as the 
ultrasound image can launch fatherhood for men.   The selective exposure or 
masking of visual evidence is key here.  Komaromy (2000) shows how 
professionals who manage dying conceal its sight, but not its associated 
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sounds, a strategy which parallels men’s exposure to the sound but not sight of 
a caesarian incision (Draper, 2000).  And survivors, like mourners at the funeral 
parlour, collude in such performances.  Describing ward behaviour after a 
death, Komaromy says:  
 
 It is as if the formal knowledge acquired through verbal or visual  
 evidence makes the event real and therefore undeniable.  Privately  
 we may suspect the 'truth', but only when it is confirmed socially are 
 we no longer able to deny it.  This is reflected in the concealment of  
 the sight of death.  Depite all the aural information, those who had  
 not actually seen the corpse had not faced death - and everyone  
 involved could act as if the death had not happened (2000:303).   
 
Conclusion 
Evidence that the status, rights and identities of the unborn and the dead have 
become a focus for contemporary debate, points towards the contested or 
precarious nature of ‘disembodied’ social identities.  This paper investigates the 
ways in which social identity can nonetheless be claimed via body-based 
material objects and practices.  In so doing it highlights the uneven but 
relational processes of identification which foster ‘social existence’ pre- and 
post-embodied life.  While ‘social existence’ is understood by authors such as 
De Vries (1981) to be contained between the twin gateposts of birth and death, 
we have argued that such a perspective merely replicates, rather than 
problematises, a particular political position vis a vis the unborn and the dead.  
As such it eradicates their potential importance for the living and so excludes 
them from any comprehensive account of the life course as a social, 
intersubjective process.  Around bones, photos and bootees, personal and 
military histories are built; and family lives are dreamt into being. 
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In exploring the material practices through which the social identity of the 
unborn and the dead might be brought into being, we have argued that a 
cultural privileging of visuality not only shores up the power and authenticity 
of the materials and practices described here: it also allows emergent social 
identities to be shaped selectively.  Though lay participation in birth and death is 
valorised, this is achieved in a misleadingly partial manner, via socially 
mediated representations of those we imagine and those we remember.   
  
Identification is therefore a negotiated process, tied to the body - but not 
limited to the body framed between the twin moments of its first and last 
breath (De Vries,1981).   Thus, for example, in the body-mediated moments of 
pregnancy - and indeed the pre-conceptual imaginings of would-be parents - as 
well as the bodily traces which linger long after breathing has ceased,  there 
exists scope for identification to take place.   A model of the life course which 
accommodates these moments enables a more expansive conceptualisation of 
social identity which recognises its nature as a relational, inevitably incomplete 
social process.    
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i Mulkay’s discussion of social death – and of postmortem social existence, raises issues of 
agency which are discussed at greater length in Hallam, Hockey and Howarth (1999:142-147) 
